An empirical exploration of the effects on legislative structure, distribution of influence, power, and decision outcomes, of recent changes in the Congress and state legislatures. The book focuses on changes in rules, parties, and committees and the impact or lack of impact of these changes on subsequent activity. Originally published in 1978 by D.C. Heath and Company. Co-published with the Policy Studies Organization.

Many philosophers of religion are unaware of research done on comparative religions, and continue to use language and to address issues that distort the nature of human religious endeavor. Despite work by Cantwell Smith, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinians, and their critics, these scholars continue to confuse faith with (propositional) belief, and miss the significance of the dynamic nature of religious culture in historic context. In this paper, I defend Walter Kaufmann's view that religion addresses an essential human ontological need, on the (...) grounds that it makes sense of the immense diversity of religious expression and endeavor. (shrink)

In the tradition of Western medicine that goes back to Hippocrates, we teach medical students to see beyond the disease and to consider the patient as a whole—to take into account the broader context of family, lifestyle, and environmental exposures. For instance, when measuring blood pressure to diagnose hypertension, family history and situational stress must be considered. Moreover, repeated measurements at multiple time points must be performed to avoid a false-positive diagnosis due to temporary fluctuations of blood pressure. The diagnosis (...) then provides, in adherence to standard-of-care guidelines, the indication for antihypertensive therapy. The recommendations have been... (shrink)

Corollaire à "l'homme mesure de toute chose" se place "l'homme démesure de toute chose". La démesure n'est pas dommageable en soi, ne pas prendre la mesure de cette démesure ni engager une culture préparant à digérer la démesure est par contre désastreux. Toute médiation est aussi facteur de démesure. Première des médiations humaines, le langage verbal entre dans un vertige de la démesure, à la mesure des médiations technologiques et de leur puissance inouïe. Cet essai sur la condensation se place (...) dans l'effort pour penser les fondements de la médiation symbolique et ce à partir d'une économie sensible de la représentation qui prend pour appui le langage plastique. Kim Leroy est docteur en Philosophie et lettres de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (2006). il enseigne la philosophie de l'art et la sémiologie des médias à l'académie royale des Beaux-arts de Bruxelles et à Arts2 à Mons. coopérateur à la coopérative Quatre Quarts à court-saint-Etienne, il est aussi observateur au conseil d'administration du Mundaneum à Mons et Membre de SEA (sustainable economy association). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY man felt two needs :"the theoretical need for guaranteeing a priori the subsistence of an ethical sphere against the Enlightenment's emphasis on happiness, and the political and practical need for guaranteeing individual freedom against an enlightened absolutism" (p. 71). Owing to this double need, Kant seems to be against himself and consequently the most critical and dialectical interpretation of Kant's thought is opposed to the (...) formalistic absolutism used by the Kantian jurists, who reject the most vital and profound critical philosophy for a metaphysical framework which confuses everything as though all were homogeneous. In fact, what appears more valid in Kant's philosophy is the continuous tension between formalism and dialectics, a tension which, even though it is never definitively overcome in a dialectical sense by Kant himself, nevertheless reveals the need for a legal dialectic rather than a formalism. It shows "the destiny of legal right to cease being a coercive apparatus, and of being transformed into rules for human society taken from civil society" (p. 390). Of course, this dialectical perspective suggests new horizons and also new problems and a wide plan of work. However, I agree with the author that the uncertainties which will inevitably emerge in this work must be met urgently and radically. For we know that "on the other scale-pan there are in fact the raw metaphysics of legal positivism, the conservatism of the jurists, and at best the formalistic, paralyzing ascetics" (p. 390). The merit of Negri's book seems to me to lie above all in the lively problematical tension with which he examines the Kantian thought. Following in the paths of G. Gurwitch, Metzger and Goldmann, as well as of Luk~s' History and Class Consciousness, he appreciates and understands the interpenetration of ethical motivations with the social and cultural environment. This historical and philosophical awareness of problems is particularly lively in the pages where the author notices the begging of principle in Kantian thought; a begging of principle consisting in the fact that "the definition of limit presupposes a limit to the principle itself, but the examination of this presupposition is neglected" (p. 77 ft.). Because of this critical and historical tension, Negri's book can be of great interest to the jurist, the philosopher and the historian. And if this ensues, it is because the conception of legal right which the author seeks to assert throughout his theoretical tension is deep-rooted humanly, dialectically, concretely. It is most needed by those who really want to make of law and right not a formal science but a human science. ANTONELLA GUARALDI Bari, Italy The Narrow Pass: Kierkegaard's Concept of Man. By George Price. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963. Pp. 5-218.) Selon hombre de ses commentateurs, Kierkegaard seralt un ehrdtien passionnd; pour d'autres, il serait une sorte d'incroyant; pour George Price, nous devrions lui accorder une unitd complexe, unitd de production, qui s'exprime directement par la suite de ses oeuvres, unitd d'intention, une vue religicuse qui repose sur une certaine conception de l'homme, un th~me fondamental aussi qui est au centre des diverses discussions sur le pdchd, la foi, la raison, la morale, la subjectivitd et le "paradoxe", tous ces probl~mes qui paraissent se poser et se reposer sans cesse pour Kierkegaard, toujours de mani~re assez nouvelle. L'homme est i~la fois une synth~se de son corps et de son moi, des causes qui ont d'abord faeonnd son ~tre, et de qu'il y a en lui d'original et qui ne sera jamais rdpdtd, ce que son esprit a fait par un effort crdateur. Et d'abord une premiere remarque pour simplifier les vues de Kierkegaard. II n'y a pas ici de substances conjointes, il n'y a que des dvdnements corporels et spirituels. L'influence de Fichte apparait par l'importance accordde au devenir, un devenir qui se poursuit selon un module et qui reste fragile, si la volontd de se rdaliser ne se maintient pas. L'homme dolt se passionner pour son existence, it dolt devenir lui-m~me. La chute de l... (shrink)

"Une expérience qui réussit dans l'air ne réussit pas toujours dans le vide. C'est ainsi que s'achève le dialogue qui clôt l'Enquête sur les principes de la morale (1751). Dans cette oeuvre que Hume jugeait être le meilleur de tous ses écrits, le philosophe écossais. fidèle à sa méthode empirique et à son "scepticisme mitigé", part en quête des indices susceptibles de révéler L'origine de la morale. N'agissons-nous que par intérêt? L'approbation morale peut-elle faire abstraction de nos préférences? À suivre (...) les hommes dans leurs choix pour en dégager la constance, on ne peut qu'être frappé par la diversité des moeurs et des coutumes. La conclusion alors révèle la subtilité du détective: la morale de Hume joint l'utile à l'agréable et l'Enquête ne se fait pas faute de rappeler, dans sa forme même, que l'exercice philosophique doit lui aussi être un plaisir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 10.2 (2005) 101-135 [Access article in PDF] Truth, Knowledge and the Wild World Jim Cheney One ought not to put too much stock in the word 'philosophy'.... [T]here are alternative ways of intelligently engaging the world. To construe one's thinking in terms of belief is characteristic of a particular kind of world view and it remains to be seen whether those who share an indigenous (...) world view conceive of experience in such an overtly intellectualized manner. Leroy N. Meyer and Tony Ramirez (1996, 104)1 Wilderness treats me like a human being. Tom Birch2As Holmes Rolston III has said, "A principal characteristic of human life is that it develops into biography. In that sense, humans do not want their values in nature, any more than they want other goods in life, to come seriatim, like beads on a string.... Humans want a storied residence in nature where the passage of time integrates past, present, and future in a meaningful career" (Rolston 1988, 351). This is what I had hoped for: a narrative of storied residence in Midwest prairie, lake, and river country, and in the mountains and deserts of Idaho, with the history of the development of an environmental ethic (or ethos) left largely implicit within that larger narrative, leaving readers to reflect as they may on the philosophical dimensions of the journey. To leave traditional philosophical [End Page 101] modes of expression completely behind proved impossible (for now), but it has been for me a worthwhile exercise to locate my reflections on "truth, knowledge, and the wild world" in something of a narrative form. It is the lakes and rivers, prairies, mountains, and deserts that have remained implicit. They have cast their spell, however, on any attempt to impose cultural order on the relationship between truth, knowledge, and the wild world. I Looking back on it, it seems that my entire philosophical career has been implicated—in one way or another, directly and indirectly—in these two questions: "How important is truth to knowledge and epistemology?" and "What is the role of natural environments in the production of knowledge?" Furthest back, at the very origin of my philosophical life, reflections on philosophical knowledge were inevitably posed and thought about in natural environments, particularly in my meditations as I drifted in the early morning mist on the St. Croix River and several Minnesota lakes, especially Cedar Lake. Even now, when I am trying to make my way to a new understanding of some philosophical issue, I walk along the shores of Lake Michigan and the Milwaukee River, or sit by rivers and lakes in Idaho, a place that became my second home after meeting my partner, Fran. Northern White Cedars stand in our yard, front and back; Western Red Cedar holds our house in its embrace.There is no question in my mind that natural environments are the deepest sources of whatever philosophical understandings I may have come to. In terms of formal studies, however, the question of the role of natural environments in the production of knowledge did not emerge for me until, well into my teaching career, I discovered the newly-emerging field of environmental ethics. It was at that point that the deepest wellspring of my philosophy and my life came together with my professional philosophical interests—in an uneasy balance. Until that time, as I think of it now, my philosophical track through the curious environment of the academy, however well it prepared me to think about central issues in environmental ethics, was mostly marked by a fascination with glittering baubles and gemstones and did not truly touch the soil, water, and atmosphere of my life.Questions of truth, knowledge, and epistemology took center stage from the beginning of my formal philosophical studies. As an undergraduate [End Page 102] at Berkeley, Thompson Clarke introduced me (in three courses) to the skeptical implications of Ordinary Language Philosophy that had escaped the attention of J. L. Austin and others. This baptism into the rigors of skeptical philosophy left me pretty much convinced, as my partner and... (shrink)

Explores intellectual and philosophical evolution of German philosopher Martin Heidegger, focusing on period after World War II. Analyzes how Heidegger s ideas, particularly his notion of being, influenced and were influenced by postwar context, including confrontation with Nazism and emergence of new philosophical currents. Argues that Heidegger s work offers relevant insights for contemporary philosophical debates and calls for a critical dialogue with his legacy. Discusses Heidegger s philosophy in the context of French and German philosophical schools, highlighting relevance of (...) his ideas and impact they had on contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Treatise with auto-commentary on Dvaita philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic DenominationsGary L. CesarzDennis Plaisted. Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 128 Cloth, $70.00.Interpreting Leibniz is like trying to flatten a balloon without deflating it; press it here and it bulges there. Press one of his controversial principles and problems result for another. Leibniz on contingent and necessary truths exemplifies this difficulty. So does Leibniz's denial that (...) there are "extrinsic denominations which have no foundationin the denominated thing" (NPE).Plaisted questions the meaning and challenges the current interpretations of this principle. Does "foundation" mean "included in a thing," or "reducible to an intrinsic denomination"? Furthermore, what is the thing denominated? Is it the individual concept of a substance, or an intrinsic denomination in the concept of the substance? Leibniz holds, "for all truths the predicate is contained in the subject" (PS) which, in some sense, includes both denominations (Leroy E. Loemker, ed., Gottfried Wilhelm Liebniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters [Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976], 268). This suggests that both denominations have the same status as predicates. However, such statements as, "there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not have an intrinsic denomination as its basis" (Loemker, 527) and "all extrinsic denominations are founded in intrinsic denominations" (Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], 225) suggest that the former reduce to the latter. The last two quotes seem to trump all hands. But textual citations are seldom enough to settle disputes of this sort.This has inspired two approaches to the question, one reductionistic, the other non-reductionistic. Plaisted adopts a non-reductionistic approach but regards those prior to his as implausible and unsatisfactory (1, 113 n.34). As for reductionism, he claims to "stand [End Page 494] [it] on its head" (1) and denies its "textual merit" (14). Given Plaisted's broad grasp of Leibniz's writings, this is not an oversight of the passages quoted above. Rather, his case depends on reinterpreting the same passages in light of his version of NPE.A reduction, according to some, requires that a relational proposition be logically equivalent (or at least truth-functionallyequivalent) to a set of non-relational propositions. For others, implication is sufficient, i.e., for a given relational proposition z, and two non-relational propositions x and y, it is impossible that (x & y) is true but z false (Mates, 218). In response, Plaisted examines NPE from four angles, including Leibniz's predicate-in-subject notion of truth, the identity of indiscernibles, and two others. However, since all that follows rides on his understanding of PS, let us focus on it.Plaisted's interprets NPE to mean "There are no extrinsic denominations of an individual... that are not included in that individual's concept" (11). To support this, he observes that Leibniz applies PS to all truths and often derives NPE from PS. But to justify substituting "included in" for Leibniz's use of "foundation in," Plaisted elects to interpret PS in a troubling way. Now, Leibniz insists that necessary truths state an identity between a subject and predicate, either explicit or implicit, and that the latter are reducible to the former by an a priori proof of finite length. Leibniz further says that identity, as explained above, is the reason that PS holds for necessary truths. Thus, Plaisted infers that "identity" and "having a reason" are equivalent, that this sense of PS generalizes to all truths (24-25), and claims support for his version of NPE. This is a positive result for Plaisted, for from it he infers that extrinsic denominations are included in the individual's concept as directly as intrinsic denominations, hence the latter cannot serve as the foundation for the former (25ff.). But this is problematic.First, it leads him to affirm that some denominations are both extrinsic and intrinsic (75). This is a strange conclusion to consider positive, for it implies that there are two types of intrinsic plus extrinsic denominations. Surely this strains the boundaries of "textual merit" at least as much as Plaisted charges against reductionists. More importantly, even if the equivalence Plaisted presses holds for necessary... (shrink)

Molla Halil’e göre insanların bu dünyada yaptıkları iyiliklere karşılık Yüce Allah onları ahirette lütfuyla nimetlendirecek ve Cennetine koyacaktır. Bu, Allah’ın insanlara bir va‘didir. Allah va‘dinden asla dönmez. Çünkü Allah’ın va‘dinden dönmesi, O’nun hakkında bir eksiklik sayılır. Ancak bu durum O’nun için vucûbiyet ifade etmez. Vucubiyet kavramı çeşitli anlamlarda kullanıldığı için anlam kargaşasına yol açabilir. Buna sebebiyet vermemek için kelamda özellikle de bu makalede “zorunluluk” anlamına kullanılacak olup bazen gereklilik anlamı da ihtiva edebilir. Allah, kötülük yapanları ise adaletiyle cezalandıracaktır. Bu da (...) Allah’ın va‘îdi olup, va‘îdi’nden dönebilir. Bu, O’nun hakkında bir noksanlığa sebebiyet vermez. Çünkü cezalandırmaktan vazgeçmesi Allah’ın merhametinin ve lütfunun bir sonucudur. Bununla birlikte ne va‘d ve ne de va‘îd Allah’a vacip değildir. Molla Halil’e göre, büyük günah insanı imandan çıkarmaz. Mu‘tezile’ye göre büyük günah işleyen kimse dünyada ne mümin olur ne de kâfir ikisinin arasında bir yerde durur. Buna da fasıklık denir. Haricîlere göre ise, ister büyük, isterse küçük olsun, her türlü günah sahibini iman dairesinden çıkarır ve küfür dairesine dahil eder. Molla Halil’e göre, ahiret hayatı ruh ve cesetle birlikte olacaktır. Bu üm-metin günahkârlarına peygamberler, şehitler ve salih kimseler şefaat edecek-tir. Mu‘tezile‘ye göre şefaat sadece iyilerin derecesinin yükselmesi içindir. Günahkârlar için şefaat olmayacaktır. Günahkâr müminler Cehenneme girseler de ebedi kalmayacaklar. Kâfirlerin azapları ise devamlı olacak ve bunlar ebedi olarak Cehennemde kalacaklardır. Biz bu makalede önce sevap ve İkâb kelimelerinin lügat ve ıstılah anlamları üzerinde duracak, sonra bu bağlamda ayet ve hadislerde verilen bilgileri ve bunların açıklamalarını ele alacağız. Daha sonra Molla Halil’in bu konulara dair görüşlerini sunmaya çalışacağız. Onun sevap ve İkâb ile ilgili tanımlarını, bunların sonuçlarına dair yaşanacakları ve varılacak yerleri ele alan yaklaşımlarını sunmaya çalışacağız. Burada farklı görüşlere sahip olmaları nedeniyle çoğunlukla Mu‘tezile’nin ve az da olsa Haricilerin görüşlerine de mukayese oluşturması için değineceğiz. Burada sadece Molla Halil’in görüşlerini değil, onun içinden geldiği Ehli Sünnetin görüşlerini, sünni kaynakları temel alarak aktarmaya çalışacağız. (shrink)

History of political ideology in Vietnam.

Decision-making capacityDecision-making capacity for pediatric patients can be difficult to determine and is influenced by a myriad of developmental considerations. This chapter begins with a discussion concerning the nature of decision-makingDecision-making and what constitutes competency. The “rule of sevensRule of sevens” frameworkFramework is then used to explicate pertinent developmental milestonesMilestones for children, dividing pediatric developmentDevelopment into 0–7, 7–14, and 14+ years of age. In particular, the authors highlight the most important cognitiveCognitive, socialSocial, andSocial emotionalemotionalEmotional considerations in each of these periods (...) and how they pertain to a child’s ability to make important medical decisions. (shrink)